Search

Advanced

Cooperation Against Proliferation: How the United States and Russia Can Stem Future Nuclear Threats

With the Obama Administration moving to “reset” relations with Moscow, much attention has focused on ongoing talks in Geneva for a new treaty for further reductions to the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. Such focus on nuclear arms control is perhaps understandable, especially given the competition in nuclear arms that had so thoroughly dominated bilateral relations for many decades. However, the Cold War’s end notwithstanding, the United States and Russia still find themselves at odds, or at least on different pages, when it comes to certain nuclear issues—most notably, on how to rein in Iran’s pursuit of the capability to produce bomb-usable nuclear material on short notice in defiance of numerous UN Security Council Resolutions.

Given that new efforts in nuclear arms control may not suffice to enlarge the community of interests between Washington and Moscow, this essay urges the United States to adopt a different, and even complementary, approach to redefining bilateral relations with Russia and cumulatively realigning each country’s interests. It calls for both countries to shift their so-called “nuclear threat reduction and nonproliferation” (NTR/N) agenda—which has historically focused on securing and stabilizing the Soviet-built nuclear establishment—towards cooperative programs to stem the spread of civil nuclear energy’s military potential to conflict-ridden regions like the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. Indeed, these are the regions where the next waves of nuclear threats are likely to emerge.


For free access to the archive, you must be a registered member of BJWA.org

Not a BJWA.org member yet?

Get Free Access

Register for BJWA.org

  • Access our archive
  • Receive reduced subscription offers & other deals
Registration is free and
only takes a minute!
Already a BJWA.org member?

Log in now




Forgot Password?

Remember me on this computer.